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PREFACE.

EXTRACT FRO:\! PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S PROCLA:\IATIO:N" OF SEPTEl\IBER 22, 18G2.

•· THAT on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thou:-:and eight hundred and sixty-three, all per' ons held as sla,·es
within any l:::itate, or designated part of a State, the people whereof
shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then,
thenceforward, and forever free; and the Execufrrn Government of
the Unite<l tates, including the military and naval authority thereof~
will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do
no act or acts to suppress such persons, or any of them, in any
efforts they may make for their actual freedom.
"That the ExecutiYe will, on the first day of January aforesaid,
by proclamation, designate the States, and parts of States, if any, in
which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion
against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people
thereof, ~hall on that day be in good faith repre ented in the Congress of the United States, by members cho-en thereto at elections
wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have
participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony,
be deemed conclusive edclence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States."

'' °"Cnderstand, I raise no objection against it on legal or constitutional grounds ; for, as commander-in-chief of the arm.1/ and navy,

in time of war, 1 suppose I have a right to take any measure which
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may best subdue the enemy." -

PRESIDENT L1xcoL...

T

TO THE

CHI-

CAGO DELEGJ..TIO ~··

PROCL..UIATIO...

OF SEPTE)IBER 24, 1 62.

•' 1'...HEREA , it ha become nece"ary to call into service not only
volunteers, but aI~o portions of the militia of the States by draft, in
order to uppress the insurrection existing in the lJnited States, and
disloyal person are not adequately restrained by the ordinary processe. of law from hindering this measure, and from gi ,·ing aid and
comfort in variou ways to the in. urrection :
"Now, therefore, be it ordered, " First. That during the exi:-ting insurrection,. and as a necessary
measure for ·uppres ·ing the same, all rf•bels and insurgent', their
aider and a.bettor·, within the United tates, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, re:;i -ting militia drafts, or guilty of
any di:;loyal practice, affor·uing aid and comfort to the 1·ebel, against
the authority of the United tate·, ::,hall be subject to martial law,
and liable to trial and puni hment by courts-martial or military commi,;:;ion.
·' econd. That the writ of habeas corpus is su·pendecl in re·pect
to all per:;ons arre ted, or '"·ho are now, or hereafter during the
rebernon shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal 1 military
prison, or other place of confinement by any military authority, or
by the sentence of any court-martial or military commi'·ion.
.. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hantl, antl cau ed the
seal of the nited tates to be affixed.
'· Done at the city of "\Va hington, this twenty-fourth day of
eptember, in the year of our Lord one thou and eight
[L. .] hundred and sixty-two, and of the independence of the
United States the eigbty-::.eventh.

r

"ABRAHAM LINCOL
" By the Pre,-ident :
'' ,Y1LLLDI

II.

SEWARD,

Secretary of State."

PREF.ACE.
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ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR PROMULGATED SEPTE~BER
26, 1862.

First. There shall be a provost marshal general of the war department, whose headquarters will be at "\Va ·hington, and who will
have the immediate supervision, control, and m:rnagement of the
corps.
Second. There will be appointed in each State one or more special provost marshals, as neces:-ity may require, who will report and
receive instructions and orders from the prornst marshal general of
the war department.
T!tird. It will be the duty of the special provost marshal to arrest
all deserters, whether regular:-, volunteers, or militia, and send them
to the neare:St military commander or military post, where they can
be cared for and sent to their respective regiments; to arre:St, upon
the warrant of the judge advocate, all disloyal person::-; subject to
arrest under the orders of the war department; to inquire into and
report treasonable practices, seize stolen or embezzled property of
the government, detect Rpies of the enemy, and perform such other
duties as may be enjoined upon them by the war department, and
report all their proceeding promptly to the provost mar.:;hal general.
Fourth. To enable special provo:St marsl1alR to discharge their duties efficiently, they are authorized to call on any available military
ful'ce within their re,:;pective districL, or else to employ the assi-tance
of citizen:-, constable , sheriff._, or police-officers, so far as may be
necessary under such regulations as may be pre,.;cribed by the provost marshal general of the war department, with the approval of
the Secretary of "\Yar.
Fifth. Necessary expenses incurred in this service will be paid on
duplicate bills certified by the special provost marshals, stating time
and nature of service, after examination and approval by the provost mar:=;hal general.
Sixth. The compensation of special pro\'ost marshals will be - dollars per month, and actual travelling expenses, and po-tage will
be refunJed on bill:S certified under oath an<l approved by the provost marshal general.

viii
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erenth. All appointment in tlk service will be subject to be

revoked at the pleasure of the ecretary of w·ar.
Eighth. All order~ heretofore bsued by the war department, conferrinrr authority upon other officer:-; to act as provost marshals, except
those who receiYed special commi ions from the war department,
are hereby revoked.By order of the

L.

ecretary of ,var,
Adjntunt-Gencral.

TIIO:\lAS,

EXECUTIVE PO"\VER.

No citizen can be insensible to the vast importance of
the late proclamations and orders of the President of the
United States. Great differences of opinion already exist
concerning them. But whatev~r those differences of opinion may be, upon one point all must agree. They are
assertions of transcendent executive power.
'rhere is nothing in the character or conduct of the chief
magistrate, -there is nothing in his present position in
connection with these proclamations, and there is nothing
in the state of the country, which should prevent a candid
and dispassionate discussion either of their practical tendencies, or of the source of power from whence they are
supposed to spring.
The President, on all occasions, has manifested the
strongest desire to act cautiously, wisely, and for the
best interests of the country. What is commonly called
his proclamation of emancipation, is, from its terms and
from the nature of the case, only a declaration of what,
at its date, he believed might prove expedient, within yet
undefined territorial limits, three months hence, thirty days
after the next meeting of Congress, and within territory not
at present subject even to our military control. Of course,
such an executive declaration as to his future intentions,
must be understood by the people to be liable to be modified bv events, as well as subject to such changes of views,
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re pecting the extent of his own powers, as a more mature,
and possibly a more enlightened consideration may produce.
In April, 1861, the Pre i<lent issued his proclamation, declaring that he would treat as pirates all persons who should
cruise, under the authority of the so-called Confederate
State , against the commerce of the United States.
But subsequent events induced him, with general acquiescence, to exchange them as pri oners of war. Not from
any fickleness of purpose; but because the interests of the
country imperatively demanded this departure from his
proposed course of action.
In like manner, it is not to be doubted by any one who
e teems the President honestly desirous to do his duty to
the country, under the best lights po sible, that when the
time for his action on his recent proclamations and orders
"ball arrive, it will be in conformity with his own wishes,
that he should have those lights which are best elicited in
this country by temperate and well-con idered public discussion; discussion, not only of the practical consequences
of the proposed measures, but of his own constitutional
power to decree and execute them.
The Constitution has made it incumbent on the President to recommend to Congress such measures as he shall
deem necessary and expedient. Although Congress \Vill
have been in session nearly thirty days before any executive action is proposed to be taken on thi · subject of emancipation, it can hardly be supposed that this proclamation
was intended to be a recommendation to them. Still, in
what the President may perhaps regard a having some
flavor of the spirit of the Con -titution, he makes known to
the people of the United States his proposed future executive action; certainly not expecting or desiring that they
should be indifferent to such a momentous proposal, or
should fail to exercise their best judgments, and afford their
best counsels upon what so deeply concerns themselves.

EXECUTIVE POWER.
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Our public affairs are in a condition to render unanimity,
not only in the public councils of the nation, but among
the people themselves, of the first importance. But the
Pre ident must have been aware, when he issued these
proclamations, that nothing approaching towards unanimity
upon their subjects could be attained, among the people,
save through their public cli::;cussion. And as his desire to
act in accordance with the wisest and best settled and
most energetic popular sentiment cannot be doubted, we
may justly believe that executive action has been postponed, among other reasons, for the very purpose of allowing time for such discussion.
And, in reference to the last proclamation, and the
order of the Secretary of War, intended to carry it into
practical effect, though their operation is immediate, so far
as their express declarations can make them so, they have
not yet been practically applied to such an extent, or in
such a way, as not to allow it to be supposed that the
grounds upon which they rest are open for examination.
However this may be, these are subjects in which the
people have vast concern. It is their right, it is their duty,
to themselves and to their posterity, to examine and to consider and to decide upon them; and no citizen is faithful
to his great trust if he fail to do so, according to the best
lights he has, or can obtain. And if, finally, such examinati01.. and consideration shall end in diversity of opinion, it
must be accepted as justly attributable to the questions
themselves, or to the men who have made them.
It has been attempted by some partisan journals to raise
the cry of "dil5loyalty" against any one who should question these executive acts.
But the people of the United States know that loyalty
is not subserviency to a man, or to a party, or to the opinions of newspapers ; but that it is an honest and wise devotion to the safety and welfare of our country, and to the
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EXECUTIVE POWER.

great principle which our constitution of government embodies, by which alone that safety and welfare can be
secured. And, when those principles are put in jeopardy,
every truly loyal man must interpose, according to his ability, or be an unfaithful citizen.
This is not a government of men. It is a government
of laws. And the laws are required by the people to be
in conformity with their will, declared by the Constitution.
Our loyalty is due to that will. Our obedience is due to
tho e laws; and he who would induce submission to other
laws, pringing from sources of power not originating in
the people, but in casual events, and in the mere will of
the occupants of place· of power, does not exhort us to loyalty, but to a desertion of our trust.
That they whose principles he que tions have the conduct of public affairs; that the times are most critical; that
public unanimity is highly necessary ; while these facts
afford sufficient reasons to restrain all opposition upon any
personal or party ground~, they can afford no good reason,
- hardly a plausible apology ,-for failure to oppose usurpation of power, which, if acquiesced in and established,
must be fatal to a free government.
The war in \Vhich we are engaged is a just and necessary war. It must be pro ecated with the whole force of
this government till the military power of the South is
broken, and they submit them::;clves to their duty to obey,
and our right to have obeyed, the Constitution of the United
States as "the supreme law of the land." But with what
sense of right can we subdue them by arms to obey the
Constitution as the supreme law of their part of the land,
if we have ceased to obey it, or failed to preserve it, as
the supreme law of our part of the land.
I am a member of no political party. Duties, inconsistent, in my opinion, with the preservation of any attachments to a political party, caused me to withdraw from all
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such connections, many years ago, and they have never
been resumed I have no occasion to listen to the exhortations, now so frequent, to dive ·t myself of party ties, and
disregard party objects, and act for my country. I have
nothing but my country for which to act, in any public
affair; and solely because I have that yet remaining, and
know not but it may be possible, from my studies and
reflections, to say something to my countrymen which may
aid them to form right conclusions in these dark and dangerous times, I now, reluctantly, address them.
I do not propose to discuss the question whether the
first of these proclamations of the President, if definitively
adopted, can have any practical effect on the unhappy race
of persons to whom it refers; nor what its practical consequences would be, upon them and upon the white population of the United States, if it should take effect; nor
through what scenes of bloodshed, and worse than bloodshed, it may be, we should advance to those final conditions; nor even the lawfulness, in any Christian or civilized
sense, of the use of such means to attain any end.
If the entire social condition of nine millions of people
has, in the providence of God, been allowed to depend upon
the executive decree of one man, it will be the most stupendous fact which the history of the race has exhibited.
But, for myself, I do not yet perceive that this vast responsibility is placed upon the President of the United States.
I do uot yet see that it depends upon his executive decree,
whether a servile war shall be invoked to help twenty millions of the white race to assert the rightful authority of
the Constitution and laws of their country, over those who
refuse to obey them. But 1 do see that this proclamation
asserts the power of the Executive to rnake such a decree.
I <lo not yet perceive how it is that my neighbors and
myself, residing remote from armies and their operations,
and where all the laws of the land may be enforced by con-
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stitutional means, hould be subjected to the possibility of
military arrest and imprisonment, and trial before a military
commi 'Sion, and punishment at its discretion for offences
unknown to the law; a po sibility to be converted into a
fact at the mere will of the President, or of some subordinate officer, clothed by him with this po-wer. But I do perceive that this executive power is asserted.
I am quite aware, that in times of great public danger,
unexpected perils, which the legi::-lative power have failed
to provide against, may imperatively demand instant and
vigorous executive action, pas ing beyond the limits of the
laws; and that, when the Executive has assumed the high
responsibility of such a necessary exercise of mere power,
he may justly look for indemnity to that department of the
government which alone has the rightful authority to grant
it;- an indemnity which should be always sought and accorded upon the clearest admission of l,,gal wrong, finding
its excuse in the exceptional case which made that wrong
absolutely necessary for the public safety.
But I find no resemblance between such exceptional
cases and the substance of these proclamations and these
orders. They do not relate to exceptional cases-they establish a system. They do not relate to some instant emergency - they cover an indefinite future. They do not seek
for excuses-they assert powers and rights. They are general rules of action, applicable to the entire country, and to
every person in it; or to great tracts of country and to the
social condition of their people; and they are to be applied
whenever and wherever and to whomsoever the President,
or any subordinate officer whom he may employ, may
choose to apply them.
Certainly these things are worthy of the most deliberate
and searching examination.
Let us, then, analyze these proclamations and orders of
the President; let us comprehend the nature and extent of
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the powers they assume. Above all, let us examine that
portentous cloud of the military power of the President,
which is supposed to have overcome us and the civil liberties of the country, pursuant to the will of the people, ordained in the Constitution because we are in a state of war.
And first, let us understand the nature and operation of
the proclamation of emancipation, as it is termed; then,
let us se: the character and scope of the other proclamation,
and the rders of the Secretary at War, designed to give it
practical effect, and having done so, let us examine the
asserted source of these powers.
The proclamation of emancipation, if taken to mean
what in terms it asserts, is an executive decree, that on
the first day of January next, all persons held as slaves,
within such States or parts of States as shall then be designated, shall cease to be lawfully held to service, and may
by their own efforts, and with the aid of the military power
of the United States, vindicate their lawful right to their
personal freedom.
The persons who are the subjects of this proclamation
are held to service by the laws of the respective States in
which they reside, enacted by State authority, as clear and
unquestionable, under our system of government, as any
law passed by any State on any subject.
This proclamation, then, by an executive decree, proposes
to repeal and annul valid State laws which regulate the
domestic relations of their people. Such is the mode of
operation of the decree.
The next observable characteristic is, that this executive
decree holds out this proposed repeal of State laws as a
threatened penalty for the continuance of a governing majority of the people of each State, or part of a State, in rebellion against the United States. So that the President hereby
assumes to himself the power to denounce it as a punishment against the entire people of a State, that the valid
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laws of that State which regulate the domestic condition of
its inhabitants, shall become null and void, at a certain
future date, by reason of the criminal conduct of a governina majority of its people.
Thi::; penalty, however, it should be observed, is not to be
inflicted on those persons who have been guilty of treason.
The freedom of their slaves was already provided for by the
act of Congress, recited in a subsequent part of the proclamation. It is not, therefore, as a punishment of guilty
persons, that the commander-in-chief decrees the freedom
of slaves. It is upon the slaves of loyal persons, or of those
who, from their tender year , or other disability, cannot be
either dHoyal or otherwise, that the proclamation is to
operate, if at all; and it is to operate to set them free, in
spite of the valid laws of their States, because a majority
of the legal voters do not send repre entatives to Congress.
Now it is easy to understand how pen,ous held to service
under the laws of these States, and how the army and navy
under the orders of the President, may overturn these valid
laws of the States, just as it is easy to imagine that any
law may be violated by physical force. But I <lo not understand it to be the purpose of the President to incite a part
of the inhabitants of the United States to rise in insurrection against valid laws; but that by virtue of some power
which he posse ses, he propose to annul tho ·e laws, so
that they are no longer to have any op('ration.
The second proclamation, and the orders of the Secretary of War, which follow it, place every citizen of the
United States under the direct military command and
control of the President. They declare and define new
offences, not known to any law of the United States.
They subject all citizens to be imprisoned upon a military
order, at the pleasure of the President, when, where, and so
long as he, or whoever is acting for him, may choose.
They hold the citizen to trial before a military commission
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appoinkc1 by the Pre-·ident, or his rPprcsentative, for such
act~ or omissions as the Prc-ident may think proper to
decree to be offences; and they ubject him to such pnniRhmcnt a t:uch military commii:l'ion may be pleasP-c.l to
iuflict. They create new offices, in such number, au<l
who:-:e occupants are to receive such compensation, as the
Pre:-:i<lcnt may direct; and the holders of tht>se offices,
,cattered through the States, but with one chief juqui ·itor
at '\Vashington, are to in pect and report upon the loyalty of the citizen·, with a view to the above described
proc:ceding' against them, when deemed suitable by the
central an1 hority.
Such is a plain and accurate statement of the nature and
extent of the powers a serted in these executive proclamation·.
\Vhat is the source of these va. t powers? Have they
any limit? Are they derived from, or are they utterly
iu<.;onsistent with, the Con.,titution of the United States?
The only supposed source or measure of these vast
po\wr.: appears to have been de jgnatec.l by the President,
in hi::- n·ply to the addre:-- of the Chicago clergymen, in the
following word::s: " Understand, I raise no objection against
it on h'gal or constitutional ground.,; for, as commande, -incltitf of tlte army and navy, in time of war, 1 suppose I
have a right to take any nieasure wlticlt may best subdue
the e 1iemy." Thi::; is a clear and frank declaration of the
opinion of the President respecting the origin and extent
of the power he suppo8es him elf to possess; and, so far as
I kno\v, no source of these powers other titan tlte authority
of commander-in-chief in time of war, has ever been, suggested.
There has been much discussion concerning the question
whether the power to suspend the "privilege of the writ of
habeas corpu '," is conferred by the Constitution on Congre::;s, or on the Pre ·i<lent. The only judicial deci ·ions
2
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which have been made upon this question have been adverse to the po\ver of the President. Still, very able la\vyers have endeavored to maintain, - perhaps to the satL:,faction of others, - have maintained, that the power to
deprive a particular person of "the privilege of the writ,"
is an executive power. For while it has been generally,
and, so far as I know, universally admitted, that Congress
alone can suspend a law, or render it inoperative, and consequently that Congress alone can prohibit the courts from
issuing the writ, yet that the executive might, in particular
cases, suspend or deny the privilege which the writ was
designed to secure. I am not aware that any one has
attempted to show, that under this grant of power to suspend " the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," the President may annul the laws of States, create new offences,
unknown to the laws of the United States, erect military
commissions to try and punish them, and then, by a sweeping decree, suspend the writ of habeas corpus as to all persons who shall be " arrested by any military authority." I
think he would make a more bold than ·wise experiment on
the credulity of the people, who should attempt to convince
them that this power is found in the habeas corpus clause
of the Constitution. No such attempt has been, and I
think none such will be made. And therefore I repeat,
that no other source of this power has ever been suggested,
save that described by the President himself, as belonging
to him as the commander-in-chief.
It must be obvious to the meanest capacity, that if the
President of the United States has an implied constitutional
right, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy in time
of war, to disregard any one positive prohibition of the
Constitution, or to exercise any one power not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, because, in his
judgment, he may thereby "best subdue the enemy," he
has the same right, for the same reason, to disregard each
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and every provision of the Constitution, and to exercise all
power, needful, in liis opinion, to enable him " best to subdue the enemy."
It has never been doubted that the power to abolish
slavery within the States was not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, but was reserved to the States.
If the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and
navy in time of war, may, by an executive decree, exercise
this power to abolish slavery in the States, which power was
reserved to the States, because he is of opinion that he may
thus "best subdue the enemy," what other power, reserved
to the States or to the people, may not be exercised by the
Pre::;ident, for the same reason, that he is of opinion he may
thus best subdue the enemy? And if so, what distinction
can be made between powers not delegated to the United
State at all, and powers which, though thus delegated, are
conferred by the Constitution upon some department of the
government other than the executive? Indeed, the proclamation of September 24, 1862, followed by the orders of the
war department, intended to carry it into practical effect,
.are manifest assumptions, by the President, of powers delegated to the Congress and to the judicial department of the
government. It is a clear and undoubted prerogative of
Congress alone, to define all offences, and to affix to each
some appropriate and not cruel or unusual punishment.
But this proclamation and these orders create new offences,
not known to any law of the United States. "Discouraging enlistments," and "any disloyal practice," are not offences known to any law of the United States. At the
same time, they may include, among many other things,
acts which are offences against the laws of the United
States, and, among others, treason. Under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, except in cases arising in
the land and naval forces, every person charged with an
offence is expressly required to be proceeded against, and
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tried by the judiciary of the United States and a jury of his
peer ; and he is required by the Constitution to be punished, in conformity with some act of Congres applicable to
the offence proved, enacted before its commission. But this
proclamation and these orders remove the accused from the
jurisdiction of the judiciary; they substitute a report, made
by some deputy provost marshal, for the presentment of a
grand jury; they put a military commission in place of a
judicial court and jury required by the Constitution; and
they apply the discretion of the commi::; iun and the President, fixing the degree and kind of punishment, instead of
the law of Congress fixing the penalty of the offence.
It no longer remain to be sugge ·ted, that if the ground
of adion announced by the Pre::;i<lent be tenable, he may,
as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, u::;e powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution ; or
'IJW!J use powers by the Constitution exclusively delegated
tu the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. These things have been already done, so far as the
proclamations and orders of the Pre::;ident can effect them.
It i -· obvious, that if no private citizen is protected in hi::;
liberty by the safeguards thrown around him by the express
provisions of the Constitution, but each and all of those
afeguards may be disregarded, to subject him to military
arrest upon the report of some deputy provo::;t marshal, and
impri::;onrnent at the plea ure of the President, and trial before a military commis~ion, and puni ·hment at its discretion,
because the President is of opinion that such proceedings
"may best subdue the enemy," then all members of either
bou e of Congress, and every judicial officer is liable to be
proceeded against as a "disloyal per;:.on," by the same means
and in the same way. So that, under this assumption concerning the implied powers of the Pre::sident as commanderin-chief in time of war, if the President shall be of opinion
that the arrest and incarceration, and trial before a military
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commission, of a judge of the United States, for some judicial decision~ or of one or more members of either hou e of
Conaress for words spoken in debate, is "a measure which
may best subdue the enemy," there is then conferred on him
by tbe Constitution the rightful power so to proceed against
such judicial or lcgislati ve officer.
This power is certainly not found in any express grant of
power made by the Constitution to the President, nor even
in any delegation of power made by the Constitution of the
United States to any department of the government. It is
claiO)ed to be found solely in the fact, that he is the commander-in-chief of its army and navy, charged with the duty
of ubdning the enemy. And to this end, as he understands
it, he is charged with the duty of u ing, not only tho e great
and ample powers which the Constitution and la\vs and the
self-devotion of the people iu executing them, have placed in
his hands, but charged with the duty of u::,ing powers which
the people have reserved to the State , or to themselves; and
is permitted to break down those great constitutional . afeguards of the partition of governmental powers, and the
immunity of the citizen from mere executive control, which
are at once both the end and the means of free government.
The necessary result of this interpretation of the Constitution is, that, in time of war, the President has any and
all power, which he may deem it nece sary to exercise, to
subdue the enemy; and that every private and personal
right of individual security against mere executive control,
and every right reserved to the States or the people, rests
merely upon executive discretion.
But the military power of the President is derived solely
from the Constitution; and it is as sufficiently de.fined there
as his purely civil power. These are its words: " The President shall be the Commander-in-chief of the army and navy
of the United States, and of the militia of the several States,
when called into the actual service of the Uuited States."

22

EXECUTIVE POWER.

This is his military power. He is the general-in-chief;
and as such, in prosecuting war, may do what generals in
the field are allowed to do within the sphere of their actual
operations, in subordination to tile laws of their country,
from, which alone they derive tlteir authority.*

* The case of Mitchel vs. Harmony ( 13 How. 115), pre ented for the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the question of the
extent of the right of a commanding general in the field to appropriate
private property to the public service, and it was decided that such an
appropriation might be made, in case it should be rendered necessary by
an immerliate and pres ing danger or urgent nece sity existing at the
time, and not admitting of delay, but not otherwise.
..
In delivering the opinion of the Court, the Chief Justice said: - " Our
duty is to determine under what circumstances private property may be
taken from the owner by a military oflicer in a time of war. And the
question here is: whether the law permits it to be taken, to in ure the
success of any enterprise against a public enemy, which the commanding
officer may deem it advisable to undertake. And we think it very clear
that the law does not permit it. The case mentioned by Lord l\Iansfield,
in delivering bis opinion in l\lostyn 1:s. Fabrigas (1 Cowp. 180), illu ' trates
the principle of which we are speaking. Captain Gambier, of the British
navy, by the order of Admiral Bo ca wen, pulled down the houses of some
sutler on the coast of ova Scotia, who were supplying the sailors with
spirituous liquors, the health of the ~ailors being injured by frequenting
them. The motive was evidently a laudable one, and the act done for the
public ervice. Yet it was an invasion of the rights of private property
and without the authority of law; and the officer who executed the order
was held liable to an action; and the utlers recovered damages against
him to the value of the property destroyed. This case shows how carefully
the rights of property are guarded by" the laws of England; and they are
certainly not less valued, nor less securely guarded, under the Constitution
and law of the United State ."
It may afely be said that neither of the very eminent counsel by
whom that c.:ase was argued, and that no judge before whom it came, had
then advanced to the coneeption that a commanding general may lawfully
take any measure which may best subdue the enemy. The wao-ons,
mules, and packages seized by General Donophon, in that case, were of
es ential service in his brilliant and successful attaek. on the lines of Chihuahua. But this did not save him from being liable to their owner as a
mere wrongdoer, under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
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When the Constitution says that the President shall be
the commander-in-chief of the arroy and navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several States
when called into the actual service of the United States,
does it mean that 1 e shall possess military power and
command over all citizens of the United States; that, by
military edicts, he may control all citizens, as if enlisted
in the army or navy, or in the militia called into the actual
service of the United States? Does it mean that he may
make himself a legislator, and enact penal laws governing
the citizens of the United States, and erect tribunals, and
create offices to enforce his penal edicts upon citizens? Does
it mean that he may, by a prospective executive decree, repeal and annul the laws of the several States, which respect subjects reserved by the Constitution for the exclusive
action of the States and the people?
The President is
the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, not only
by force of the Constitution, but under and subject to the
Constitution, and to every restriction therein contained,
and to every law enacted by its authority, as completely
and clearly as the private in his ranks.
He is general-in-chief; but can a general-in-chief disobey any law of his own country? When he can, he superadds to his rights as commander the powers of a usurper ;
and that is military despotism. In the noise of arms have
\Ve become deaf to the warning voices of our fathers, to
take care that the military shall always be subservient to
the civil power? Instead of li ·tening to these voices, some
persons now seem to think that it is enough to silence objection, to say, true enough, there is no civil right to do this
or that, but it is a military act. They seem to have forgotten that every military act is to be testeJ by the Constitution and laws of the country under whose authority it is
done. And that under the Constitution and law~ of the
United States, no more than under the government of
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Great Britain, or under any free or any settled government,
the mere authority to command an army, is not an authority
to disobey the laws of the country.
The framer of the Constitution thouaht it wi~e that the
power of the commander-in-chief of the military force of
the United States should be placed in the hands of the chief
civil magistrate. But the power of Commander-in-chief
are in no degree enhanced or varied by being conferred upon
the same officer who has important civil function . If the
Con titution had provided that a Commander-in-chief should
be appointed by Congress, hi power would have been the
same a the military power of the President now are.
nd
,Yhat would be thought by the American people of an attempt by a general-in-chief, to legi fate by his decrees, for
the people and the States.
Besides, all the powers of the President a~e ex cniive
merely. He cannot make a law. He cannot repeal one.
He can only execute the Ia,vs. He can neither makP, nor
su pend, nor alter them. He cannot even make an article
of war. He may govern the army, either by general or
special orders, but only in subordination to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the articles of
war enacted by the legislative power.
The time has certainly come when the people of the
United States must under tand, and must apply those great
rules of civil liberty, which have been arrived at by the selfdevoted efforts of thought and action of their ance tor , during even hundred years of struggle against arbitrary power.
If they fail to understand and apply them, if they fail to
hold every branch of their government steadily to them, who
can imagine what is to come out of this great and de ·perate struggle. The military power of eleven of the e States
being destroyed- what then? What is to be their conclition ? What is to be our condition ?
Are the great principles of free government to be used
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and con. urned as means of war? Are we not wise enough
and strong enough to carry on this war to a successful military end, without submitting to the loss of any one great
principle of liberty? We are strona enough. We are wise
enough, if the people and their servants will but understand
and ob erve the just limits of military power.
"\Vhat, then, are those limits? They are these. There is
military law; there is martial law. Military law is that
system of laws enacted by the leaislative power for the
government of the army and navy of the United States, and
of the militia when called into the actual 8ervice of the
United States. It has no control whatever over any per on
or any property of any citizen. It could not even apply to
the teamsters of an army, save by force of express provisions
of the laws of Congress, making such persons amenable
thereto. The persons and the property of private citizens of
the United States, are as absolutely exempted from the control of military law as they are exempted from the control of
the laws of Great Britain.
But there is also .LYlctrtial law. What is this? 1 It is the
1 The following extracts from the opinion of Mr. Justice Woodbury,
delivered in the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Luther
i:s. Borden, (7 How. 62,) states what martial law is, and some of the incidents of its history : " By it every citizen, instead of reposing under the shield of known and
fixed laws as to his liberty, property, and life, exHs with a rope round his
neck, subject to be hung up by a military despot at the next lamp-post,
under the sentence of some drum-head court-martial. See Simmons' Pract.
of Court -Martial, 40. Sec such a trial in IIough on Courts-Martial, 383,
where the victim on the spot wa 'blown away by a gun,'' neither time,
place, nor persons con i<lcred.' A an illustration how the pas'age of such
a law may be abu eel, Queen Mary put it in force in 155 , by proclamation
merely, and declared, 'that whosoever had in his po session any heretical,
trea onable, or seditious books, and did not pre ently burn them, without
reading them or showing them to any other person, should be esteemed a
rebel, and without any further delay be executed by the martial law.'
Tytler on Military Law, p. 50, c. 1, § 1.
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will of a military commander, operating without any restraint, -ave bis judgment, upon the live , upon the property, upon the entire social and individual condition of all
over whom thi law extend.... But, under the Con ·titution
of the United States, over whom, dofs such law extend?
Will any one be bold enough to say, in view of the history of our ance, tors an<l ourselves, that the President of
the nited State can extend such law as that over the entire country, or over any defined geographical part thereof,
"For convincing rea$ons like the e, in every country whieh makes any
claim to political or ci"il liberty, 'martial law' as here attempted, an<l as
once practised in England against her own people, bas been expre' ·ly forbidden there for near two centuries, a well a· by the principle of every
other free con titutional government. 1 Hallam' · Con ·t. Hist. 420. And
it would be not a little extraor<linary, if the spirit of our institutions, both
state an<l national, was not much stronger than in England ag~inst the unlimited exercise of martial law over a whole people, whether attempted by
any ehief magHrate, or even by a legi ·lature.
" One objeet of parliamentary inquiry a~·early as 1620, was to eheck
the abu ~e of martial law by the king, whieh had prevailed before. Tytler
on Military Law, 502. The Petition of Right, in the first year of Charles
I., reprobated all such arbitrary proceedings in the just terms and in the
ter::;e language of that great patriot a well as judge, Sir Edward Coke,
and prayed they might be stopped and never repeated. To this the king
wisely replied, ' Soit droit fa.it comme e t de ·ire.' - 'Let right be done as
desired.' Petition of Right in tatute at Large, 1 Charles I.
"Putting it in force by the King alone was not only re trained by the
Petition of Right, early in the seventeenth century, but virtually denied
as lawful by the Declaration of Rights in 168 . Tytler on lilitary Law,
307. Hallam, therefore, in bi, Con titutional Hi tory, 420, cleclares, that
its use by ' the commissioner" to try military offenclcrs by martial law, was
a procedure neees ary, within certain limits, to the discipline of an army,
but unwarrantecl by the con titution of thi country.' Indeed, a distinguished English judge ha since sai<l, that ' martial law' as of old, now 'does
not exit in England at all,' was ' contrary to the Constitution, an<l has been
for a century totally explo<lecl.' Grant v. Gould, 2 Hen. BL 69; 1 Hale,
P. C. 3--16 · Hale Com. Law, c. 2, 36; 1 11acArthur, 55.
' This is broad enough, and is correct a to the community generally, in
both war and peaee."
'
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save in connection with some particular military operations
which he is carrying on there? Since Charles I. lost his head,
there has been no ldng in England who could make such
law, in that realm. And where is there to be found, in our
history, or our constitutions, either State or national, any
warrant for saying, that a President of the United States
has been empowered by the Constitution to extend martial
law over the whole country, and to subject thereby to his
military power, every right of every citizen? He has no
such authority.
In time of war, a military commander, whether he be the
commander-in-chief, or one of his subordinates, must possess and exercise powers both over the persons and the
property of citizens which do not exist in time of peace.
But he possesses and exercises such powers, not in spite
of the Constitution and laws of the United States, or in
derogation from, their authority, but in virtue thereof and
in strict subordination thereto. The general who moves
his army over private property in the course of his operations in the field, or who impresses into the public service
means of tran ·portation, or subsi 'tence, to enable him to
act against the enemy, or who seizes persons within his
lines as spies, or destroys supplies in immediate danger of
falling into the hands of the enemy, uses authority unknown to the Constitution and laws of the United States
in time of peace; but not unknown to that Constitution
and those laws in time of war. The power to declare war,
includes the power to use the customary and necessary means
effectually to carry it on. As Congress may institute a
state of war, it may legi late into existence and place under
executive control the means for its prosecution. And, in time
of war without any special legislation, not the commanderin-chief only, but every commander of an expedition, or of
a military post, is lawfully empowered by the Constitution
and laws of the United States to do whatever is necessary,
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and is sanctioned by the laws of war, to accomplish the lawful objects of his command. But it is obviou that this
implied authority must find early limits somewhere. If
it were admitted that a commanding general in the field
might do whatever in his discretion might be necessary to
subdue the enemy, he could levy contributions to pay bis
soldier~ ; he could force con cripts into his service; he could
drive out of the entire country all persons not desirous to
aid him; - in short, he would be the absolute ma ter of the
country for the time being.
To one ha· ever supposed - no one will now undertake
to maintain - that the commander-in-chief, in time of war,
has any such lawful authority as thi .
\Vhat, then, i his authority over the per ons and property of citizens? I an ·wer, that, over all per ons enli::;ted in
his forces he has military power and command; that over
all persons and property 'lcitltin the sphere of his actual
operations in the field, he may lawfully exercise such restraint and control as the successful pro~ecution of his particular military enterprise may, in his honest judgment,
absolutely require; and upon such persons as have committed offence against any article of war, he may, through
appropriate military tribunals, inflict the punishment prescribed by law. And there his lawful authority ends.
The military power over citizens and their property is
a power to act, not a power to prescribe rules for future
action. It springs from present pres ing emergencie', and
is limited by them. It cannot assume the function of the
statesman or legislator, and make provi ·ion for future or
distant arrangements by which persons or property may be
made subservient to military uses. It is the physical force
of an army in the field, and may control whatever is so
near as to be actually reached by that force, in order to remove obstruction to its exerci e.
But when the military commander controls the persons
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or property of citizens,. who are beyond the sphere of
his actual operations in the field when he makes laws to
govern their con<luct, he becomes a legislator. 'I'hose laws
may be made actually operative; obedience to them may
be enforced by military power; their purpose and effect
may be solely to recruit or support his armies, or to weaken
the power of the enemy with whom he is contending.
But he 1·s a legislator still; and whether his edicts are
clothed in the form of proclamations, or of military orders,
by whatever name they may be called, they arc laws. If
he have the legislative power, couferred on him by the people, it is well. If not, he usurps it.
He has no more lawful authority to hold all the citizens
of the entire country, out::;ide of the sphere of hi::; actual
operations in the field, amenable to his military edicts, than
he has to hold all the property of the country subject to his
military requisitions. He is not the military commander
of the citizens of the United States, but of its soldiers.
Apply the e principles to the proclamations an<l orders of
the Pre::;ident. They are not designed to meet an existing
emergency in some particular military operation in the
field; they prescribe future rules of action touching the
per::.ons and property of citizens. ·They are to take effect,
not merely within the scope of military operations in the
field, or in their neighborhood, but throughout the entire
country, or great portions thereof. Their subject-matter is
not military offonces, or military relations, but civil offences,
and domestic relations; the relation of master and servant;
the offences of " disloyalty, or treasonable practices." Their
purp0::;e is not to meet some existing and instant military
emergency, but to provide for distant events, which may
or may not occur; and who ~e connections, if they hould
coincide with any particular military operations, are indirect,
remote, casual, and pos::;ible merely.
It is manife::;t that in proclaiming these edicts, the Presi-
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dent i not acting under the authoi·ity of military law; :first,
because military law extends only over the persons actually
enlisted in the military ervice ; and second, because these
persons are governed by la.ws enacted by the legislative
power. It i equally manife t that he is not acting under
that implied authority which grows out of particular actual
military operations; for these executive decrees do not
spring from the special emergencies of any particular military operation and are not limited to any field, in which
any uch operations are carried on.
Whence, then, do the c edicts spring? They spring from
the as 'Urned power to extend martial law over the whole territory of the United States; a power, for the exercise of
which by the President, there is no warrant what vcr in the
Constitution; a power which no free people could confer upon
an executive officer, and remain a free people. For it would
make him the ab olute master of their lives, their liberties,
and their property, with power to delegate his mastership to
such satraps as he might select, or as might be impo::;e<l on
hi credulity, or his fears. Amidst the great danaers which
encompa s us, in our struggles to encounter them, in om:
natural eagerness to lay hold of efficient means to accom. pli ·h our vast labors, let us beware how we borrow weapon from the armory of arbitrary power. They cannot be
wielded by the hand of a free people. Their blows will
:finally fall upon themselves.
Distracted council , divided strength, are the very earliest
effects of an attempt to u e them. What lies beyond, no
patriot is now willing to attempt to look upon.
A leading and influential ne\vspaper, ·while expressing
entire devotion to the Pre ident, and approbation of his
proclamation of emancipation, says: " The Democrats
talk about 'unconstitutional acts.' Nobody pretends that
this act is constitutional, and nobody cares whether it is or
not."
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I think too well of the President, to believe he has
done an act involving the lives and fortunes of millions
of human being:s, and the entire social condition of a great
people, without caring whether it is conformable to that
Constitution which he has, many times, sworn to support.
Among all the causes of alarm which now distress the
public mind, there are few more terrible to reflecting men,
than the tendency to lawlessness which is manifesting itself
in o many directions. No stronger evidence of this could
be afforded, than the open declaration of a respectable and
widely circulated journal, that '' nobody cares" \Vhether a
great public act of the President of the United States, is in
conformity with, or is subversive of the supreme law of the
land, - the only basis upon which the government rests;
that our public affairs have become so de~perate, and our
ability to retrieve them by the use of honest means is so
distrusted, and our willingness to use other means so
undoubted, that our great public servants may themselves
breaI~ the fundamental laws of the country, and become
usurpers of vast powers not intrnsted to them, in violation
of their solemn oaths of office; and "nobody cares."
It is not believed that this is just to the people of the
United States. 'fhey do care, and the President cares, that
he and all other public servants should obey the Constitution. Partisan journals, their own honest and proper
desire to support the President,-on whose wisdom and firmness they rely to relieve their country from it::; evils and
dangers, - and the difficulties which the mass of the people
encounter in forming opinions on questions of constitutional law, may prevent them, for a limited time, from
arriving at a just judgment of such questions, or of the
vast practical effects dependent on thern.
But the people of the United States do not expect national
concord to spring from usurpations of power; or national
security from the violation of those great principles of public
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liberty, which are the only po· ible foun<lation, in this country,
of private safety and of public order. Their instincts demand
a purer and more comprehensive statesmanship than that
which eizes upon unlawful expedients, because they may
po-sibly avert for the moment some threatening danger, at
the expense of the violation of great principles of free government, or of the de truction of ome necessary -afeguard of
individual secmity.
It is a subject of di. cussion in the public journals whether
it is the intention of the Executive to use the powers asserted in the last proclamation and in the orders of the
Secretary of War, to suppress free di cus ion of political
subject', I have confidence in the purity and the patrioti;:;m both of the President and of the Secretary of vVar. I
fear no such present application of this proclamation and
the ·e orders by them. But the execution of ·uch power~
must be intru:--t d to subordinate agents, and it is of the very
e-sence of arbitrary power that it should be in hands ,vhich
can act promptly and efficiently, and unchecked by forms.
These great powers must be confided to persons actuated
by party, or local or per onal feelings and prejudices;
or, what would often prove as ruinous to the citizenactuated by a desire to commend their vigilance to their
employers, and by a blundering and stupid zeal in their
service.
But it is not this 01· that particular application of power
which is to be considered. It is the existence of the power
it elf, and the uses of which it is susceptible, while follow,
ina out the principle on which it has been as urned.
The uses of power, even in de potic monarchies, are
more or less controlled by usages and customs, or in other
word , by public opinion. In good hands, and in favorable
times, <le ·potic power is not commonly allowed to be felt to
be oppre sive; and, aiways, the forms of a free government,
which has once existed, so far as is practicable, are carefully
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and i:-pcciously preserved. But a wi e people does not trust
its condition and right to the happy accident of favorable
times or good hands. It .i jealous of power. It knows
that of all earthly thing:-1, it is that thing most likely to be
abused; and when it affects a nation, most de tructive by
its abuse. They will rou e themselves to con ider what is
the power claimed; what i' its origin; what is its extent;
what u es may be made of it in dangerous times, and by
men likely to be produced in such times ;-and while they
will trust their public servants, and will pour out their dearest blood like water to sustain them in their honest measures for their country's salvation, they will demand of those
crvants obedience to their will, as expressed in the fundamental law of the government, to the end that there shall
not be added to all the sufferings and losses ihey have
uncomplainingly borne, that most irreparable of all earthly
losses - the ruin of the principles of their free government.
What then is to be done? Are we to cease our utmost
efforts to ·ave our country, because its chief magistrate
seems to have fallen, for the time being, into what we
believe would be fatal errors if persisted in by him and acquiesced in by ourselves? Certainly not. Let the people
but be right, and no President can long be wrong; nor can
he effect any fatal mischief if he hould be.
The sober second thought of the people has yet a controllincr power. Let this gigantic shadow, which has been
evoked out of the powers of the commander-in-chief, once
be placed before the people, so that they can see clearly its
proportions and its mien, and it will dissolve and disappear
like the morning cloud before the rising sun.
The people yet can and will take care, by legitimate
means, without disturbing any principle of the Constitution or violating any law, or relaxing any of their utmost
efforts for their country's salvation, that their will, embodied
m the Con titution, shall be obeyed. If it needs amend3
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ment, they will amend it themselves. 'rhey will suffer
nothing to be added to it, or taken from it, by any other
power than their own. If they should, neither the government itself, nor any right under it, will any longer be
theirs.

